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Abstract 
We investigate whether ownership structure, accounting opacity, board 
structure & processes and managerial incentives attributes relate to future 
stock price crash risk. Principal component analysis on the 21 attributes 
that comprise these four corporate governance dimensions reveals that 
they can explain between 13.1% and 23.0% of a one standard deviation in 
crash risk. Transient institutional ownership, CEO stock option incentives 
and the proportion of directors that hold equity increase crashes, whilst 
insiders’ ownership, accounting conservatism, board size and the presence 
of a corporate governance policy mitigate crash risk. Overall these 
relations are more pronounced in environments that accentuate agency 
risk. 
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1. Introduction 
The great breadth and depth of corporate governance literature, as shaped by a growing 
empirical and theoretical research in the past few decades, is indicative of the significant role 
that corporate governance systems play in protecting shareholders’ welfare. This study 
investigates which corporate governance attributes, amongst the many that firms employ, are 
the most prominent ones in explaining the link between governance and future stock price 
crashes.  
Stock price crashes are likely to occur among firms with high agency risk [Callen and 
Fang (2013); Kim and Zhang (2015)]. Managers, in such firms, due to career concerns and 
incentives arising from compensation contracts, may exploit information asymmetries to 
conceal negative information and engage in short-sighted price maximisation to better serve 
their own interests [Stein (1989)]; either through earnings management [Kothari et al. (2009)] 
or suboptimal investment decisions that cater to prevail market sentiment [Bebchuk and Stole 
(1993)]. However, withholding, delaying or accumulating the disclosure of bad news is 
unsustainable for long periods and will eventually lead to significant stock price crashes 
when the true fundamentals unexpectedly reveal an enormous amount of negative 
information in the market [Bleck and Liu (2007); Callen and Fang (2013); Kim and Zhang 
(2015)].  
A large body of literature finds that corporate governance systems can alleviate agency 
risk, curbing such opportunistic managerial behaviour that could be harmful to shareholders 
[Xie et al. (2003); Klein (2002); Karamanou and Vafeas (2005); Masulis et al. (2007)]. Prior 
research on the effect of corporate governance on various organizational outcomes typically 
focuses on individual governance mechanisms or constructs one-dimensional governance 
metrics by summing up individual variables [Gompers et al. (2003)]. Similarly, the crash risk 
literature has only focused upon a single governance mechanism [Hutton et al. (2009); Kim et 
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al. (2011); Callen and Fang (2013); Kim et al. (2015)].
1
 In contrast, we undertake a 
comprehensive investigation using a broad set of governance attributes which provides a 
more appealing and credible approach [Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006); Bhagat et al. (2008); 
Bebchuk et al. (2009)] and enables us to measure the overall quality of a firm’s governance 
system and ascertain which are the most relevant in limiting crash risk. 
Drawing motivation from all these studies we examine which corporate governance 
attributes mitigate the 1-year-ahead firm-specific stock price crashes.
2
 We jointly consider 
four central dimensions of governance mechanisms (i) ownership structure, (ii) accounting 
opacity, (iii) board structure & processes, and (iv) managerial incentives, which comprise a 
broad set of 21 attributes. Each of these corporate governance dimensions are designed to 
increase or enhance the monitoring of management’s actions to promote effective decision-
making, limit their opportunistic behavior and reduce the information asymmetry between the 
firm and its external stakeholders [Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006)]. Although we motivate the 
use of each of the corporate governance attributes employed, we do not expect that all 21 
would equally affect a firm’s propensity to stock price crashes since some attributes might 
have little or no relevance to the phenomenon under scrutiny. Hence, in this study, we rely on 
various regression model specifications from principal component analysis (PCA) to a horse-
race approach to identify which of these dimensions and attributes are responsible for 
explaining future firm-specific stock price crashes and under what circumstances.  
Our regression approach is carefully implemented to tackle econometric problems 
previously identified in the corporate governance literature and which often cloud the 
interpretation of results, for example simultaneous causality and dynamic endogeneity issues 
[Bhagat and Bolton (2008); Cremers and Ferrell (2014); Callen and Fang (2013); Kim and 
                                                             
1 Kim and Zhang (2014) also examine the relation between financial reporting opacity and ex ante (or 
perceived) crash risk, as reflected in the steepness of implied volatility smirks. 
2 We use the terms firm-specific stock price crash and crash risk interchangeably to refer to 1-year-ahead crash 
risk that results from sharp stock price declines. 
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Zhang (2015)] and the limiting interpretation of a single or composite corporate governance 
index  [Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006); Cremers and Ferrell (2014)].  
Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that a firm’s governance system can 
be setup to mitigate the occurrence of future stock price crashes. Specifically, the principal 
component analysis reveals that, depending on the regression estimation setting, the statistical 
significant factors that emerge from the governance attributes can explain overall between 
13.1% and 23.0% of a one standard deviation of future crash risk. Thus, the effect of 
corporate governance on crash risk is not just statistically significant but also important in 
economic terms. Further detailed analysis, reveals that the governance attributes pertaining to 
both ownership structure and accounting opacity provide a first-order effect in mitigating the 
occurrence of future crash risk, and can explain on their own approximately 9.0% and 3.4% 
of a one standard deviation of future crash risk, respectively. Whilst the remaining 
dimensions, namely board structure & processes and managerial incentives add very little, if 
any, on their own, to the explanatory power of the model that links the governance factors to 
crash risk. 
Analysis of the 21 governance attributes employed, reveal seven which appear to be the 
most prominent ones to explain the occurrence of future stock price crashes. Specifically we 
find that crash risk increases with transient institutional ownership, CEO stock option 
incentives and the proportion of outside directors that hold equity in the company. 
Furthermore, despite the widespread claim that directors’ share-ownership aligns managerial 
and shareholders incentives, our results with respect to outside directors suggest that this 
incentive mechanism may not reduce crash risk, but rather increase it instead, consistent with 
Song and Windram (2004). We also find that crash risk decreases with insiders’ ownership, 
the level of conditional accounting conservatism in the financial reports, board size and the 
presence of corporate governance policy in a firm’s mandate. In this respect, firms with larger 
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boards and a clear defined corporate governance policy are also more likely to reduce the 
agency conflicts that induce crash risk. 
Interestingly, unlike prior research, we do not find that the opacity of the financial 
reports increases stock crashes [Hutton et al. (2009)]. Further analysis reveals that this lack of 
a positive relationship is driven by the financial crisis, an economic downturn period in which 
managers had limited opportunities and fewer incentives to stockpile negative information 
through earning management practices [Jenkins et al. (2009); Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2011); 
Chia et al. (2007); Filip and Raffournier (2014); Bertomeu and Magee (2011)], a precursor 
situation to stock price crashes. 
Finally, we examine whether industry or firm characteristics, which are known to affect 
the effectiveness of corporate governance systems [Giroud and Mueller (2010)], moderate the 
aforementioned relations. We find that the impact of governance on future crash risk is 
stronger when the company: (i) operates in a low competition industry, (ii) operates in 
environments with high information asymmetry, and (iii) experiences higher earnings or 
cash-flow uncertainty. These findings bring additional evidence to the extant literature that 
sheds light on market conditions and firm-specific environment that fuel managerialism 
behaviour, which could foster suboptimal decision making that subsequently leads to stock 
price crashes. 
Our study contributes to the literature that investigates the determinants of firm-specific 
stock price crashes. Chen et al. (2001) find that firms with high past returns and more volatile 
firms are more pronounced to crashes while Hong and Stein (2003) provide evidence that 
investor heterogeneity is positively associated with crashes. Our analysis shows that 
controlling for these effects, governance also strongly and economically meaningful relates to 
crash risk. In this respect, we contribute to the empirical research that investigates how 
corporate governance systems affect shareholders’ welfare.  
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We also contribute to studies that look at specific governance attributes that may affect 
stock price crashes. For example, Hutton et al. (2009), Kim et al. (2011), Kim and Zhang 
(2015) and Callen and Fang (2013) find stock price crashes increase with opacity in financial 
reports, executive equity incentives, non-conservative accounting practices and transient 
institutional ownership, respectively. Our study extends this work by providing the first 
comprehensive comparison of a large array of corporate governance attributes that may 
mitigate (or increase) future crash risk. We are therefore able to identify which of these 
corporate governance attributes are the most powerful in explaining the occurrence (or not) of 
crash risk.  
In addition, whilst we confirm a number of the prior findings with respect to 
institutional ownership and accounting conservatism, we also shed light on other salient 
governance attributes that affect crash risk, namely, director equity ownership, board size and 
presence of a clearly defined corporate policy. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to 
report new firm-level evidence pertaining to the economic and welfare consequences of the 
abovementioned set of governance attributes in the realm of crash risk studies.  
At the same time, our study bases its empirical inference on the period 2002-2013 
which starts on the onset of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and extends well beyond the recent 
financial crisis. This allows us to demonstrate that the breakdown of the positive relation 
between accounting opacity and crash risk, is driven by the years during and following the 
crisis, which reflects, in part, the increased demand for conservative earnings during this 
period. We therefore provide complementary evidence to prior studies that find that the 
business cycle or dramatic changes in the economic climate have an impact on the firm’s 
propensity to manipulate earnings [Filip and Raffournier (2014); Bertomeu and Magee 
(2011); Jenkins et al. (2009)]. Our findings also show that accounting conservatism is 
resilient to the prevailing economic conditions since its impact on crash risk is strong 
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throughout the whole period of our investigation and is unaffected by the crisis period. These 
findings highlight the need for more conservative accounting practices, given its moderating 
effect on crash risk.  
The study proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the research design and the 
corporate governance attributes investigated, section 3 describes the data, section 4 discusses 
empirical results, section 5 presents additional analyses and section 6 concludes the study. 
2. Research design 
2.1. Model specification 
To implement our analysis we model the relation between corporate governance and 
future stock price crashes using variants of the following regression model specification: 
t
M
m
N
Mn
tntmt CONTROLGOVERNANCECRASH    
 

1 1
110 ,  (1) 
GOVERNANCE includes up to 21 corporate governance attributes and CONTROL 
includes control variable according to prior crash risk literature. 
To treat any simultaneous causality effects, the baseline model specification regresses 
corporate governance attributes on crash risk with a lag of one-period [see, for instance, 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006); Bhagat and Bolton (2008); Callen and Fang (2013); Kim and 
Zhang (2015)]. We also include three lags of the dependent variable to allow current 
governance attributes to be inﬂuenced by realizations and/or shocks of past firm-specific 
stock price crashes taking into account any dynamic endogeneity that may exist in the panel 
of data. Estimating in this manner provides a dynamic OLS model of governance and crash 
risk. 
All regression models include dummies to control for unobserved time-invariant year 
and industry factors. Industry indicator variables are based on Fama and French (1997) 48 
industry categories. In addition, standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level to 
control for potential bias in the estimates when the residuals of a firm are correlated across 
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firms [Petersen (2009)]. All continuous variables are standardized to have a mean value of 
zero and variance of one to put all variables on a common scale. 
Finally, by employing a broad set of corporate governance attributes and a large 
number of control variables, we handle endogeneity that could be the result of unobserved 
heterogeneity without the need to reside on fixed effect estimation. However, despite this we 
also include firm fixed effect specifications to control for the possibility that corporate 
governance and stock price crash risk are simultaneously determined by other exogenous 
variables. However, since there is great risk that the fixed effects estimators may not detect 
an effect of corporate governance attributes on crash risk, even if it exists [Zhou (2001); 
Wintoki et al. (2012)], we focus our inferences mostly on the results that emerge in the cross-
sectional analysis and provide the firm fixed effects as a complimentary (robustness) 
analysis.  
2.1.1. Measurement of firm-specific stock price crashes 
We first estimate firm-specific weekly returns using the following expanded index 
model regression: 
tjtmjtmjtmjtmjtmjjtj rrrrrr ,2,,51,,4,,31,,22,,1,     (2) 
where tjr ,  is the return on stock j in week t and tmr ,  is the CRSP value-weighted market index 
in week t. To allow for non-synchronous trading we include lead and lag variables for the 
market index. Since residuals from the expanded index model may be skewed, we define the 
firm-specific weekly return for firm j in week t as the natural logarithm of one plus the 
residual (i.e., ]1ln[ ,, tjtjW  ). Following Chen et al. (2001) and Hutton et al. (2009) we 
employ two primary measures of crashes, namely the negative conditional skewness 
(NCSKEW) and the down-to-up volatility (DUVOL). Larger values of NCSKEW and DUVOL 
signify greater crash risk. In particular, NCSKEW in year t for stock j is calculated as follows:  
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where n counts the number of days in a fiscal year. DUVOL in year t is calculated as 
follows:  
]])1/[()1log[( 2,
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tjutj WnWnDUVOL    (4) 
where un  and dn  are the number of up and down days over the fiscal year, respectively. In 
detail, for each stock j over a fiscal year t, we separate all the weeks with firm-specific 
returns below the annual mean from those firm-specific returns that are above the annual 
mean and categorize them as “down weeks” and “up weeks”, respectively. We then compute 
the standard deviation for the two predefined subsamples. DUVOL is the log of the ratio of 
the standard deviation of the “down weeks” over the standard deviation of the “up weeks”.  
2.1.2. Corporate governance attributes 
A corporate governance structure combines controls, policies and guidelines that drive 
the organization toward its objectives while also satisfying stakeholders' needs. A corporate 
governance structure is often a combination of various mechanisms. Therefore we consider a 
large set of individual governance variables and rely on a variety of traditional measures of 
governance used by regulators.  
Ownership structure 
Investors have emerged as an important force in corporate monitoring. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) argue that institutional shareholders, by virtue of their large shareholdings 
have incentives to collect information and monitor management since they reap greater 
benefits [Shivdasani (1993)]. However, a competing view, is that large outside shareholders 
may also act as speculators than as stable investors, thus pressurizing management to deliver 
short run performance and providing a weak monitoring system [Graves and Waddock 1990; 
Porter (1992); Bushee (1998)]. Consistent with both the monitoring and expropriation view, 
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Callen and Fang (2013) find that stable institutional investors act as monitors in influencing 
managerial behaviour and are negatively associated with crash risk, whilst unstable (or 
transient) institutions appear to focus on short-term increases and are positively associated 
with crashes.  
We use six variables to proxy ownership structure. The first three measures replicate 
those employed by Callen and Fang (2013) to distinguish between stable and unstable 
institutional investors. Specifically, we measure institutional stability by dedicated 
institutional ownership (%INST_DED), transient institutional ownership (%INST_TRANS) 
and institutional holdings volatility (INST_STD). We also measure the number of outside 
blockholders that own at least 5% of a firm (BLOCK) since previous research suggests that 
major investors also influence corporate policy in a similar way to institutional shareholders 
[see Barclay and Holderness (1991); Bethel et al. (1998)]. Prior literature also suggests that 
insider ownership reduces agency costs since inside ownership helps align insider-owner’s 
interest with those of outside shareholders [Fama and Jensen (1983); Jensen and Meckling 
(1976)]. As insider ownership rises, insiders have incentives to protect shareholders’ interest 
and thus would need less supervision, albeit in a non-linear fashion [Morck et al. (1988); 
McConnell and Servaes (1990); Bhagat et al. (1999)]. We measure insider ownership 
(%INSIDER) as the percentage of equity held by insiders (officers, managers and directors). 
Our last ownership variable captures whether the outside directors that sit on the 
various committees own shares in the company. Currently, there is mixed evidence as to 
whether directors that own stocks have the incentive to engage in the companies’ operations 
more diligently [Yermack (2004)] or not [Core et al. (1997); Brick et al. (2006)]. We use the 
percentage of directors that hold stock in the firm (%BRD_STOCK) to capture outside 
director’s monitoring incentives [see Core et al. (1997); Yermack (2004)]. 
We expect that %INST_DED, BLOCK and %INSIDER to be negatively related to future 
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crash risk, while both INST_STD, %INST_TRANS to be positively related. Given the mixed 
evidence as described above, we make no predictions on the sign of the relation between 
outside-directors’ stock ownership (%BRD_STOCK) and future crashes. 
Accounting opacity 
Accounting transparency is crucial to mitigating the information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders that fuels agency risks. Although the quality of the accounting in 
a firm is a function of the efficacy of both the internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms it is also in-itself a governance mechanism [Watts (2003); Ball and Shavakumar 
(2005); Guay and Verrecchia (2006); Jankensgard (2014); Lara et al. (2009)]. We therefore 
include accounting quality as a corporate governance mechanism and use two measures 
previously used in the crash risk literature: opaqueness (OPAQUE) in the spirit of Hutton et 
al. (2009), and Khan and Watt’s (2009) accounting conservatism (C_SCORE). We include 
both measures as they capture different aspects of accounting quality [Kim and Zhang 
(2013)]. Following prior literature, we expect high C_SCORE (OPAQUE) to decrease 
(increase) crash risk. 
The independent assessment of the audit committee is also crucial to the effective 
monitoring of a firms’ financial reporting process. Klein (2002), for instance, finds a negative 
relation between audit committee independence and earnings management practices [see also 
Agrawal and Chadha (2005)]. To proxy for the quality of the audit process, we measure the 
proportion of outside independent directors in the audit committee (%AUD_IND). Finally, as 
part of their overall disclosure strategy, firms may select audit firms who are industry-
experts. As Dunn and Mayhew (2004) posit auditor expertise signals a firm’s intention to 
provide enhanced disclosures. Therefore we also include auditor industry expertise 
(AUD_EXP) to be a dummy variable that equals one when the audit firm of a particular firm 
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has more than a third of market share of total sales within an industry, and zero otherwise. 
We expect both of these audit attributes to be negatively associated with crash risk. 
Board structure & processes 
We use five measures to capture the different aspects of the board structure & processes 
identified in the corporate governance literature. We measure the composition of the board as 
the percentage of outside directors on the board (%BRD_IND). Typically a board with more 
outside directors is considered to be more effective in monitoring management which will 
protect shareholders from self-serving managerial behavior [see also Agrawal and Chadha 
(2005); Xie et al. (2003); for an opposing view see Hermalin and Weisbach (1991)].  
 Smaller boards are also considered to be more effective in attaining higher monitoring 
[Lipton and Lorsch (1992); Jensen (1993); Yermack, 1996]. However, recent papers suggest 
that the board size effect depends very much on the organizations form [Coles et al. (2008); 
Ni and Purda (2012)]. To capture the effectiveness of the board based on its size we include 
the measure, namely BRD_SIZE, defined as the number of members sitting in the board. 
The impact of busy boards on corporate governance is rather mixed. Firms with very 
busy board members have been found to be associated with weak corporate governance [Fich 
and Shivdasani (2006)], while more competent directors enhance the firm’s corporate 
governance [Klein (1998); Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006)]. We include a measure to capture 
outside director busyness/competence (%BRD_COMP) defined as the percentage of directors 
that also serve on boards of other firms.  
Several studies examine and find that the separation of the CEO and chairman positions 
is associated with the boards monitoring efficacy [Fama and Jensen (1983) Yermack (1996)]. 
We therefore include a dummy variable (CEO_DUALITY) that equals 1 when the two 
positions, CEO and chairman, are held by the same person, and zero otherwise.  
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Finally, the last attribute identifies using a dummy binary variable whether a company 
has a formal, clearly defined corporate governance policy in its mandate (GPOL). Such a 
policy, among others, includes guidelines regarding board and committee nomination, 
composition, and independence. In addition, it provides directions concerning board 
meetings, director attendance, compensation and more importantly evaluation of the 
Chairman, CEO and board/committees performance.  
We expect that %BRD_IND and GPOL to be negatively related to future crash risk, 
while CEO_DUALITY to be positively related. Given the mixed evidence we make no 
predictions on the sign of the relation between board sizes (BRD_SIZE), directors’ 
busyness/competence (%BRD_COMP) and future crashes. 
Managerial incentives  
The early literature argues that increasing the use of equity-based compensation is a 
more effective way of aligning the interest of managers and shareholders by exposing 
managers’ wealth to their firms’ stock price and reducing the agency costs. However recent 
evidence suggests and finds that both CEOs and CFOs compensation structure may induce 
self-serving behavior [Healy (1985); Bergstresser and Phillippon (2006); Benmelech et al. 
(2010); Kim et al. (2011)] and thereby reduce corporate governance efficacy [Bebchuk et al. 
(2009)]. This incentive is argued to be more powerful for their option holdings relative to 
their stock holdings [Burns and Kedia (2006); Benmelech et al. (2010)]. Moreover, Kim et al. 
(2011) finds that CFO equity incentives are more important than CEO incentives in 
determining crash risk. We include two different measures to capture equity-based 
compensation incentives for both CEOs and CFOs. Specifically, we measure the option 
holdings incentives ratio (INC_OPT) and stock holdings incentives ratio (INC_STC) (as in 
Bergstresser and Phillippon (2006) and Kim et al. (2011)) for both the CEO and the CFO. We 
expect, consistent with the findings of Kim et al. (2011), that these measures will be 
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positively related to future crash risk for both managerial positions. As option-holdings 
provide more powerful incentives for managers to inﬂate short-term share prices [Burns and 
Kedia (2006); Kim et al. (2011)], we expect the link between option-based compensation and 
future crashes to be more important than the stock-based one.  
Annual pay of managers also includes a cash-based compensation such as bonus. 
Benmelech et al. (2010) demonstrates that bonus compensation induces truth-telling when 
combined with a stock-based component implying a negative link of bonus with sharp stock 
price declines. At the same time, prior research argues that managers’ bonus plans can also 
induce short-termism behavior [Healy (1985)] which may induce a positive link of bonus to 
future crashes. Therefore, the link of bonus to future crashes is an empirical question. We 
measure the cash-based compensation for both the CEO and CFO using the level of bonuses 
paid (BONUS) scaled by salary and we make no predictions on the sign of the relation of 
BONUS and future crash risk. 
2.1.3. Control variables 
The model of Hong and Stein (2003) predicts that investor heterogeneity causes greater 
crashes. Thus, we control for investor heterogeneity using the detrended average weekly 
stock trading volume in year t-1 (DTURNt-1). We also include past average firm-specific 
weekly returns (RETURNt-1) and past volatility of firm-specific weekly returns (STDt-1) over 
the fiscal year period t-1 [Chen et al. (2001)]. Finally, based on the analysis of Hutton, et al. 
(2009), we include (one-period lagged values of): firm size defined as the natural logarithm 
of market value of equity (SIZEt-1), market value of equity to book value of equity (MBt-1), 
financial leverage defined as the total liabilities to total assets (LEVt-1), and return on equity 
defined as income before extraordinary items to equity (ROEt-1). Most of our control 
variables also capture the tradeoff between the monitoring costs and private benefits of 
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control the firm faces [Wintoki et al. (2012)], and therefore are suitable time-varying 
variables that may jointly affect both stock price crashes and governance. 
3. Dataset 
We collect weekly returns from CRSP to estimate stock crash risk measures, the 
corporate governance attributes are constructed using information from the Corporate Library 
and firm-specific financial information are from Compustat. Information for CEO duality and 
managerial incentives are obtained from ExecuComp. To construct the institutional 
ownership variables we use data from the Thompson-Reuters Institutional Holdings 
Database.
3
  
Our sample covers the period 2002-2013. Similar to prior literature, we exclude 
financial services firms (SIC 6000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), firm-years with price at 
the fiscal year-end less than $2.5, and firm-years with less than 26 weeks of stock returns 
during a fiscal year. Further, we exclude observations with missing information and we 
winsorize continuous variables at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles to mitigate possible data errors 
and influential extreme observations. The final sample with full information on all variables 
consists of 1552 firms with 8119 firm-year observations. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. The mean (median) values of NCSKEW and 
DUVOL are 0.101 (0.046) and -0.000 (-0.011) respectively and are comparable with prior 
studies [e.g., Kim et al. (2011)]. Within the ownership structure component of governance, 
the mean (median) stock holdings are 3.6% (0.0%) for dedicated (%INST_DED) and 17.3% 
(15.8%) for transient (%INST_TRA) institutional investors while institutional volatility in 
stock holdings (%INST_STD) is 0.2% (0.0%). Moreover, the number of blockholders 
                                                             
3 We thank Brian Bushee for providing the data to classify institutional investors into transient and dedicated 
groups.  
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(BLOCK) is 2.677 (3.000), and insiders’ stock holdings (%INSIDER) are 10.5% (4.9%) while 
87.7% (100%) of the outside directors hold stocks in the firm (%BRD_STOCK). 
Regarding the accounting opacity element of governance, the mean (median) values of 
opacity (OPAQUE) in financial reports are 0.363 (0.208) while accounting conservatism 
values (C_SCORE) are 0.040 (0.035). Not surprisingly, 93.8% (100%) of the directors on the 
audit committee are independent (%AUD_IND). Finally, 22.6% of the firms appoint industry-
specialist audit firms (AUD_EXPERT). 
For the board structure & processes dimension of governance, the mean (median) 
percentage of independent directors (%BRD_IND) serving the board is 73.5% (75%) and the 
mean of board size (BRD_SIZE) is 8.173. The mean (median) of the board members who also 
serve on other boards (%BRD_COMP) is 37.2% (35.7%), about 57% of the CEOs also serve 
as chairman to the board (CEO_DUALITY) and approximately 73.7% of the firms have a 
formal corporate governance policy (GPOL) in their mandate.  
Concerning managerial incentives components of governance, the mean (median) 
incentive ratios for CEOs are 17.9% (14.0%) for options (CEO_INC_OPT) and 16.0% (8.1%) 
for stocks (CEO_INC_STC). The corresponding figures for CFOs are 10.4% (7.7%) for 
options (CFO_INC_OPT) and 4.8% (2.8%) for stocks (CFO_INC_STC). Moreover, CEOs 
receive bonuses (CEO_BONUS) of about 50% of their salary, while for CFOs 
(CFO_BONUS) this figure is about 37.5% of their salary.  
Our sample consists of large profitable firms, the mean (median) market capitalization 
is about $1,737 million ($1,525) while return on equity is 10.9% (11.4%). The average firm 
exhibits moderate growth opportunities with average market to book ratio of 3.143 and 
employ leverage of 48.3%. In summary, our sample is fairly representative of studies that 
utilize data from the same sources, certainly in terms of firm size, market to book and 
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leverage [Callen and Fang (2013)]; as well as board characteristics such as board size and 
percentage of independent directors on the board [Larcker et al. (2007)]. 
Table 2 shows Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients above (below) the diagonal 
among the crashes and corporate governance variables. As expected, the two crash risk 
measures are significantly related to one another with a positive correlation of approximately 
0.96. Among the governance attributes, various correlations are significant but not to a degree 
to raise collinearity concerns. Untabulated results of the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
indicate that our regression model specifications are unlikely suffer from the collinearity 
problem.
4
 We also find that many of the corporate governance attributes exhibit statistical 
significant association with the two measures of crash risk.    
[Insert Table 2] 
4. Multivariate analysis results 
4.1. Governance factors and crash risk 
We rely on exploratory principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the large number 
of governance attributes we use into a few governance factors that account for most of the 
variance in the observed variables. Our objective is to assess through the factor analysis: (i) 
the overall impact of the governance attributes, and (ii) the impact of each of the four 
corporate governance dimensions, to explain the variability in future crashes. This analysis 
can reveal the overall economic impact of the whole governance system as formed by the 21 
attributes; specifically we can determine how much of one standard deviation of the crash 
risk measures is explained by each of the governance factors because these factors are 
orthogonal by construction.  
We follow similar PCA procedures to those used in the prior literature. As in Larcker et 
al. (2007), we retain all factors with an eigenvalue greater than unity. We also employ the 
                                                             
4 The highest correlations appear between the CEO and CFO compensation components; to guard against 
erroneous inferences our baseline regression analysis (Table 4) considers specifications where CEO and CFO 
incentives are included separately.  
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scree test [Jolliffe (2002)] to affirm that this approach delivers the same number of factors as 
with the eigenvalue approach. To serve the purpose of our PCA investigation, the retained 
factors are rotated using an orthogonal rotation as in Dey (2008). To safeguard the efficacy of 
PCA, we examine the variables’ factor loadings and verify that the retained factors capture 
distinct governance aspects since there are no significant cross-loadings or situations where 
the same governance attribute is significantly associated with more than one factor. 
We rely on the PCA to generate different sets of governance factors. First, PCA is 
applied to the whole set of 21 attributes to create seven significant factors (namely PC1 to 
PC7) that retain 57.3% of the total variance in the original data. Second, PCA is applied to 
the attributes of each of the four governance dimensions we consider in this study. Out of the 
ownership structure dimension we retain two factors (PC_OWN1 and PC_OWN2), which 
retain 41.4% of the total variance of the six attributes that characterize this dimension. Out of 
the accounting opaqueness dimension we retain two factors (PC_OPAQ1 and PC_OPAQ2), 
which retain 53.6% of the total variance of the four attributes that characterize this 
dimension. Out of the board structure & processes dimension we again retain two factors, 
(PC_BOARD1 and PC_BOARD2), which retain 50.0% of the total variance of the five 
attributes that characterize this dimension. Finally, out of the managerial incentives 
dimension we retain three factors, (PC_INC1 to PC_INC3), which retain 78.9% of the total 
variance of the six attributes that characterize this dimension.  
Table 3 provides coefficient estimates of various specifications of the governance 
factors on NCSKEW (Panel A) and DUVOL (Panel B), controlling for other known 
determinants of crash risk. Column (1) in Panel A (Panel B) reports the cross-sectional 
coefficients with the seven factors, namely PC1 to PC7, estimated from all 21 governance 
attributes when regressed on NCSKEW (DUVOL). We find that three (five) factors are 
significant at conventional statistical levels (p-values < 0.10 or better). Column (2) in panels 
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A and B which includes firm fixed effects, shows three factors that strongly relate to future 
crashes (p-values < 0.05 or better). More importantly, however, the impact of the overall 
governance system is economically meanigful. In particular, column (1), in panels A and B, 
demonstrates that the accumulated absolute coefficient values of the statistical significant 
factors that emerge from the governance attributes can explain overall between 13.1% to 
19.3% of a one standard deviation of crash risk. A similar picture emerges when we include 
the firm fixed effects (see column (2) in panels A and B) in this case the statistical significant 
factors can explain overall between 18.4% to 23.0% of a one standard deviation of crash risk. 
This analysis lends credence to the notion that the 21 governance attributes we consider offer 
an economic meaningful practice in mitigating crash risk.  
Column (3) in Panel A (Panel B) reveals that the governance dimension ownership 
structure provides the most prominent governance dimension since both factors are strongly 
statistically significant (p-values < 0.01) and offer a first-order effect in mitigating the 
occurrence of future crashes since this dimension can explain on its own about 8.6% (9.3%) 
of a one standard deviation of crash risk. Accounting opacity is the second most important 
governance dimension with one statistical significant factor (p-value < 0.05) and can explain 
on its own overall about 3.4% of a one standard deviation of crash risk, see column (4). The 
other two dimensions, namely board structure & processes and managerial incentives 
(columns 5 and 6 respectively) add very little on their own, if any, to the explanatory power 
of the model. Columns (7) and (8) include all governance dimension factors pooled together 
in the same regression and confirm our previous conjectures. These results provide an 
indication on how governance dimensions differ and by how much, which may help 
shareholders to fortify their firms’ corporate governance systems in ways that could mitigate 
future crashes.  
[Insert Table 3] 
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In terms of control variables, consistent with Chen et al. (2001) we find that future 
crashes are positively related to the firm-specific returns (RETURN) and the volatility of 
firm-specific returns (DTURN). Future crashes are also positively related to return on equity 
(ROE) and, similar to Hutton et al. (2009), negatively related to firm leverage (LEV). It is 
interesting to note that the lagged values of the dependent variable are generally insignificant, 
which indicates that it is unlikely for the same firm to experience multiple crashes over the 
years. This suggests that the patterns we document are less likely to reflect reverse-causality. 
4.2 Governance attributes and crash risk: A horserace approach 
In this section we take a horserace approach to examine the relation between corporate 
governance and future stock price crashes using the 21 corporate governance attributes. Table 
4 reports only the coefficients of the governance attributes, for brevity the control variables 
are unreported. In Panel A (Panel B) the dependent variable is NCSKEW (DUVOL). Columns 
(1) to (5) report the relations between each governance dimension to future crashes. Since 
some of the CEO and CFO incentives are highly correlated with one another, we have two 
estimations for the fourth governance dimension (namely, managerial incentives) to avoid 
erroneous inferences that may emerge from the collinearity problem; in this respect, column 
(4) reports the relation between CEO incentives and future crashes, while column (5) reports 
the same but for the CFO. Column (6) reports the results for all 21 attributes; columns (7) and 
(8) report separately the effect of CEO and CFO incentives when included with all other 
governance attributes in the presence of firm fixed firm effects whereas column (9) includes 
the firm fixed effects equivalent of column (6).  
[Insert Table 4] 
The results in Table 4 column (1) indicate a strong positive relationship between 
transient institutional ownership (%INST_TRA) and future crash either when using NCSKEW 
(Panel A) or DUVOL (Panel B). This relationship continues to hold when including firm 
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fixed firm effects (see column (6)). Columns (1) and (6) in Panel B also show a positive 
relation of institutional ownership stock-holdings volatility (INST_STD) and DUVOL. These 
results support the expropriation hypothesis, whereby institutions pressurize management to 
deliver short-run performance [Graves and Waddock (1990); Porter (1992); Bushee (1998)]. 
Interestingly, the percentage of outside directors that hold equity in the firm 
(%BRD_STOCK) is also positively related to future crashes. This result suggests that outside 
directors with equity ownership may encourage myopic behavior [see for example Brick et al. 
(2006)]. Both of these empirical inferences continue to hold true when we include all other 
corporate governance variables and firm fixed effects (column (9) Panels A and B). Column 
(1) and (6) attest that there is also strong evidence that insider ownership (%INSIDER) is 
negatively related to future crashes, consistent with the view that insider ownership aligns 
shareholders’ and managers’ interests [Morck et al. (1988); McConnel and Servaes (1990], 
although it loses significance when firm fixed effects are included (column (9)); which is 
consistent with the findings that insider ownership typically change slowly overtime within a 
firm [Hermalin and Weisbach (1991); Zhou (2001)].
5
 All other variables within this 
dimension (column (1)) have the expected sign, with the exception of BLOCK, but none are 
found to be statistically significant. 
Investigating the accounting opacity dimension, the results in column (2) show that 
accounting conservatism (C_SCORE) is negatively related to future crashes (p-values < 
0.01). This relation remains robust under all specifications (columns (6) to (9)), and is 
consistent with Kim and Zhang (2015) that accounting conservatism reduces managers’ 
incentives to manipulate earnings and reduces the agency problems between managers and 
outside investors [Watts (2003); LaFond and Watts (2008); among others]. Regarding the 
other three accounting opacity attributes, namely OPAQUE, %AUD_IND and 
                                                             
5 Following Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) we also include the squared term of insider 
ownership in the regression analysis. Untabulated results reveal no relation between the squared term of insider 
ownership and crashes.  
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AUD_EXPERT, although we observe their predicted signs, none of them is statistically 
significant. The lack of significance on accounting opacity (OPAQUE) challenges the results 
reported in Hutton et al. (2009), which we investigate further (see section 4.4.), and find that 
the link of accounting opacity to crash risk is conditional on the economic cycle. In terms of 
board structure & processes both board size (BRD_SIZE) and the presence of a governance 
policy (GPOL) show a negative relation to future crashes (column (3) panels A and B). 
BRD_SIZE is statically significant under the majority of specifications; however GPOL is 
only statistically significant when the dependent variable is NCSKEW. BRD_SIZE results are 
robust when including firm fixed effects although GPOL no longer loads under the firm fixed 
effect model (column (9)).
6
 All other remaining variables are not found to be statistically 
significant. Overall, there is empirical evidence to suggest that larger boards and the presence 
of a formal clearly defined governance policy limits managers ability to engage in suboptimal 
behavior. This finding is consistent with recent papers that suggest that the board size effect 
depends very much on the organizations form [Coles et al. (2008); Ni and Purda (2012)]. 
Column (4) in both panels, show a positive statistical significant relation (p-values < 
0.05) between CEO option incentives (CEO_INC_OPT) with future crashes. This relation 
continues to hold under most of the specifications, with the exception of column (6). 
Interestingly, we do not however observe any significant relations for the CFO case. Overall, 
there is no compelling evidence from columns (6) and (9) to suggest that managerial 
incentives can curb the incentive to hide bad news to avoid crash risk.
7
 These findings are 
inconsistent with Kim et al. (2011), which may be due to the different sample periods being 
investigated. Unlike Kim et al. (2011) our sample period captures the period post the 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 which Cohen et al. (2005) finds is a period that managers 
                                                             
6 It is reasonable to observe that GPOL is not statistically significant in the firm fixed effects estimation due to 
the stickiness of this governance attribute that results in extremely low within-firm variation.  
7 Investigation of columns (4) and (5) in comparison to (6), as well as (7) and (8) in comparison to (9) reveal 
that some high correlations between the CEO and CFO managerial compensation attributes does not lead to any 
co-linearity issues. 
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behave less opportunistically compared to the pre-Sox period. Overall, compared to Kim et 
al. (2011), our findings suggest that in the post-SOX period, equity-based compensation is 
less likely to induce bad news hoarding, and thus future crashes. 
Finally, because all continuous variables have been standardized to have a zero mean 
value and standard deviation of one, we can use coefficient estimates to assess each 
attribute’s economic importance. Depending on the crash risk measure a change in the 
continuous corporate governance attributes by one standard deviation can explain up to 6.6% 
of one standard deviation of the crash risk measure (see, for instance, C_SCORE coefficient 
in column 6, Table 4, Panel B). This value is extremely high once we consider the economic 
impact of well-founded determinants of crash risk like market-to-book (MB), leverage (LEV) 
and return-on-equity (ROE), whose standardized coefficient values are about 3.0%, 5.0% and 
7.0%, respectively. Therefore, some of the governance attributes are especially important in 
mitigating the crash risk, especially those that relate to ownership (%INST_TRA, %INSIDER, 
%BRD_STOCK), accounting conservatism (C_SCORE), board size (BRD_SIZE) and the 
presence of a well-defined governance policy (GPOL) that maintain the highest coefficient 
values.  
Taken all together, the results lend support to our expectations that a number of 
corporate governance practices play an important role in mitigating the occurrence of future 
stock price crashes.  
4.3 When does corporate governance really matter? 
The demand for better governance depends on the severity of agency problems since 
the industry or environment in which the company operates in accentuates agency risk. In 
that respect, either the market is less able to punish opportunistic managerial behaviour or it 
is easier for managers to mask short-run price maximization as being a long-run value 
maximisation business strategy. We test this hypothesis using two proxies that capture 
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information asymmetry problems, namely industry competition and the volatility of stock 
returns, as well as two measures that capture higher earnings/cash-flow uncertainty in which 
agency risk may be more pronounced.  
Giroud and Mueller (2010) argue that the effect of corporate governance on agency 
problems depends on the competitiveness of the industry. When competition is high, 
managerial slack is punished by the market, and therefore the importance of corporate 
governance as a monitoring mechanism is reduced. We measure industry competition using 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is computed as the sum of squared market 
shares as follow: 

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where Si,j,t is the market share of firm i in industry j in year t. Market share is calculated using 
firm sales. We estimate industry competition for each of the Fama and French 48 industry 
classifications. Higher values of HHI indicate weaker industry competition.  
We also consider whether the uncertainty that surrounds the firms’ operations plays a 
role. Since corporate governance helps bridge the information gap between shareholders and 
managers, it is expected to be more important in environments of high uncertainty where this 
asymmetry is likely to be more pronounced [Dey (2008); Jankensgard (2014)]. We measure 
uncertainty using the standard deviation of daily stock returns in the last 12 months [Baker 
and Wurgler (2006)].  
Additionally, we investigate how corporate governance impacts firms with higher (or 
lower) earnings/cash-flow uncertainty. These firms are expected to be more reliant on 
internal funds and to pay low dividends [Chay and Suh (2009)], which may force managers to 
put greater emphasis on short-term price maximization and engage significantly more in 
practices to conceal bad news regarding the firm’s operating performance. In this respect, 
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corporate governance should be more effective to mitigate crash risk in firms that face high 
earnings/cash-flow uncertainty. We measure this type of uncertainty with two variables:
8
 (i) a 
simple measure of operating profits volatility computed using the last 5-years’ standard 
deviation of sales and (ii) a sophisticated measure of cash flow volatility following Garfinkel 
and Hankings (2011) computed as the quarterly volatility of operating profits using the prior 
20 periods.
9
 
We break our sample in two groups based on the magnitude of the segregation 
variables in year t-1 (high or low splitting at the median for continuous variables), and we re-
run the baseline analysis from Table 4 for the two subsamples separately. This approach 
reveals the impact of corporate governance on crashes in these different regimes.  
[Insert Table 5] 
The results are shown in Table 5 where the main regression specifications are broken 
down by the degree of agency risk (LOW vs. HIGH). Columns (1) and (2) show the effects of 
industry competition. As expected, the effects of corporate governance on future crashes are 
stronger in industries with low competition. Specifically, consistent with our previous 
findings, in less competitive industries future crashes as captured by NCSKEW are positively 
related to transient institutional ownership (%INST_TRANS) and the percentage of outside 
directors that hold stock in the firm (%BRD_STOCK). The results also show a negative 
relation between NCSKEW and accounting conservatism (C_SCORE), board size 
(BRD_SIZE) and the presence of a clear corporate governance policy (GPOL). In summary, 
consistent with Giroud and Mueller (2010), the effects of governance on future crashes are 
more important in the less competitive industries since we observe greater statistical 
significance for the governance attributes for this group. 
                                                             
8 All items are scaled by total assets to remove any undue influence from larger firms. 
9 Given cash ﬂow volatilities, we create a dummy variable to capture when a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow uncertainty has 
recently spiked. Following, Garfinkel and Hankings (2011) we employ the “rolling increase” measure and 
assign the value of 1 if three or four of the last four quarterly values of cash ﬂow uncertainty were increasing 
relative to the prior quarter and zero otherwise.  
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A similar picture emerges in the other cases where we either consider the relation 
between governance attributes and crashes depending on either the level of firm stock return 
volatility in columns (3) and (4) or firm profits/cash-flow volatility as depicted by the two 
measures we employ in columns (5)-(8). In general, we observe that the overall effects of 
governance are more pronounced when stock return volatility (column (4)), operating profits 
volatility (column (6)) and cash flow volatility (column (8)) is high. In particular, consistent 
with our previous findings, future crashes are positively related to transient institutional 
ownership and the percentage of directors that hold stock in the firm. Interestingly, consistent 
with Kim et al. (2011) in columns (4) and (6) there is also a positive relation between CEO 
option incentives ratio and future crashes. Future crashes are also negatively related to insider 
ownership, to accounting conservatism practices, board size, and the presence of formal 
government policy.
 10
  
Finally, despite the fact that some of the governance attributes also load significantly on 
the low agency risk cases resulting in similar coefficients (using an F-test for comparison) 
between the two groups, overall, the findings indicate that the effects of the governance 
variables on future crashes are mostly driven from firms facing higher market or idiosyncratic 
uncertainty.  
4.4. The role of accounting opacity in economic downturn periods  
Our results in Table 4 show that accounting opacity is not significantly related to future 
crash risk which is inconsistent with Hutton et al. (2009), but partially consistent with the 
Hutton et al.’s assertions that the relationship diminishes post-SOX era. Given our sample 
begins post SOX and extends beyond the financial crisis, it provides us with the opportunity 
to investigate whether the lack of association we observe is due to the new regulatory 
environment which may limit managers’ ability to hide information or alternatively that the 
                                                             
10
 We obtain similar results when we use analyst forecast dispersion as a proxy for information uncertainty.  
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adverse economic conditions limits a firm’s propensity to engage in income-increasing 
practices, and thus their ability to hoard bad news [Jenkins et al. (2009); Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005)] a necessary condition for the occurrence of crashes.  
To investigate this issue, we use the model specification in column (6) reported in 
Table 4, but now include interaction variables to identify whether the crisis and post-crisis 
period limits the firm’s ability to manipulate earnings and thus moderates OPAQUE’s  
association with crash risk. Since OPAQUE is the rolling-sum of a firm’s prior three years of 
discretionary accruals we create a CRISIS_POST dummy variable that reflects both the crisis 
and post-crisis period (2007-2012) in terms of a firm’s discretionary accruals. Accordingly, 
CRISIS_POST takes the value of one for all years after 2009, and zero otherwise, thus 
capturing the firms reported discretionary accruals during the crisis and post-crisis period.
11
 
In this sense, the interaction term OPAQUEt-1* CRISIS_POST captures the incremental 
changes in the relation between earnings management and future crashes during and 
following the financial crisis period, while OPAQUEt-1 mainly captures the relation between 
earnings management and future crashes during the pre-crisis period.  
[Insert Table 6] 
Table 6 presents the results of the above model specification in column (1) for 
NCSKEW and in column (3) for DUVOL.
12
 We find that OPAQUE is now positive and 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.05), suggesting that the association between opacity and 
future crashes has not dissipated following SOX, as suggested by Hutton et al. (2009). We 
do, however, find that the coefficient on OPAQUEt-1*CRISIS_POST is negative and 
statistically significant, which indicates that the relation between opacity and crash risk is 
                                                             
11 Following recent literature [Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2010)], we define the financial crisis period from 
2007 to 2009. We find however that our results are not sensitive to different cut-off years surrounding the crisis 
period. For example, redefining the crisis period to 2008-2009 rather than 2007-2009 does not change our 
inferences. 
12 For brevity, Table 6 reports only the results relating to OPAQUE and C_SCORE. Regression results regarding 
all other corporate governance variables are qualitatively similar to the ones presented in Table 4.   
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considerably less pronounced during and post the crisis period. In columns (2) and (4) we 
segment the financial crisis years into the crisis period itself (CRISIS) and the post-crisis 
period (POST_CRISIS) to ascertain whether the driver of these results is the crisis period 
specifically or the post-crisis period instead.
13
 The results indicate that the coefficients on 
both OPAQUEt-1*CRISIS and OPAQUEt-1* POST_CRISIS are negative and significant, in 
almost all cases, consistent with our prior findings; it appears however that the crisis period 
(2007-2009) has the greatest moderating effect on the association between accounting opacity 
and crash risk. 
These finding are consistent with the prior literature that earnings management reduces 
both during and following economic downturn periods. This may be due to the increased 
uncertainty about future outcomes and the heightened focus on the downside risk which 
should motivate market forces to demand more conservative earnings, and dissuade firms 
from hoarding bad news [Jenkins et al. (2009)]. Or alternatively, that surrounding an 
economic downturn period the market is more inclined to tolerate poor performance [Ahmad-
Zaluki et al. (2011)] and as a consequence managers have fewer incentives to engage in 
earnings management to mask any bad news. Moreover during a recession period firms may 
also be subject to increased monitoring from auditors, creditors and other stakeholders which 
should also result in managers having less discretion to alter their earnings [Chia et al. 
(2007); Bertomeu and Magee (2011); Filip and Raffournier (2014)]. Finally, litigation risk 
will also be higher during periods of economic decline and therefore managers may respond 
to this risk by limiting or even reverting income-smoothing [Jenkins et al. (2009)]. All other 
corporate governance variables continue to hold their signs and significance as previously 
reported in Table 4.  
                                                             
13 CRISIS takes the value of one for the fiscal year 2010, and zero otherwise. Therefore, the interaction term 
OPAQUEt-1*CRISIS captures the incremental changes in the relation between discretionary accruals during the 
crisis period (i.e. 2007-2009), and crash risk. While, POST_CRISIS now takes the value of one for all years after 
2010, and zero otherwise. Again our results are not sensitive to alternative cut-off periods for the crisis and post 
crisis.  
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Overall, the relation of opacity to crashes appears to depend on the economic 
conditions, unlike accounting conservatism which we find maintains its strong negative 
relation to crashes irrespective of the consequences of the crisis period. These findings 
highlight that accounting conservatism is a strong innate corporate governance attribute that 
mitigates the presence of crash risk regardless of the economic cycle climate, making it more 
important for firms (and policymakers) to put in place practices that would prevent firms 
from stockpiling negative information.  
5. Additional analyses 
To assess the robustness of our results we carry out additional checks that consider 
deriving the overall effect from alternative measures of stock price crashes and other 
corporate governance variables.  
5.1 Alternative measures of stock price crashes  
We re-estimate all models of Table 4 using two alternative measures of crashes. The 
first is an indicator variable (CRASH) that equals one when a firm experiences at least one 
crash week during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. A crash week is when a firm 
experiences firm-specific weekly returns 3.09 standard deviations (3.09 is chosen to generate 
a frequency of 0.1% in the normal distribution) below the mean firm-specific weekly returns 
for the entire fiscal year. The second measure is the extreme sigma (EXTR_SIGMA). 
EXTR_SIGMA is the negative of the worst deviation of firm-specific weekly returns from the 
average firm-specific weekly return divided by the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly 
returns. Particularly, for a given firm in a fiscal year we compute EXTR_SIGMA as follows: 
           ][_
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  (6) 
where the firm-specific weekly return for firm j in week t, tjW , , is similar to the one used for 
the estimation of NCSKEW and W is the standard deviation of this return.  
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Untabulated results reveal that our previous findings remain unchanged to the definition 
of the crash risk measure.  
5.2. Other variables: Additional governance attributes and CEO traits  
There is a vast array of corporate governance variables that have been used in the prior 
literature to capture the different characteristics of a board [Larcker et al. (2007); Dey 
(2008)]. Drawing on these prior studies we investigate whether any of these additional 
attributes are associated to crash risk: number of board meetings; percentage of directors with 
tenure above 15 years; percentage of directors below the age of 70; percentage of directors 
that are CEOs in other companies; whether the firm has a staggered board, and if the firm 
founder is a board member. Moreover, following the findings of Giroud and Mueller (2010) 
we include the HHI index (as computed for the needs of Table 5) as an additional control 
variable. In untabulated results we find the inclusion of these additional corporate governance 
variables, without and with firm fixed effects, are not statistically significant, nor do they 
change in any way prior inferences. 
In addition, we also investigate whether CEO’s traits influence their behaviour and firm 
outcomes [Hambrick and Mason (1984)]. If CEOs’ actions fail to deliver, which affects their 
personal wealth; this may incentivize CEOs to conceal adverse operating outcomes from 
shareholders which subsequently can lead to crashes. CEOs sensitivities about firm 
performance, however, vary across CEOs’ career horizon [Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994); 
Prendergast and Stole (1996); Boschen et al. (2003); Yim (2013)], and gender [Khan and 
Vieito (2013)]. To capture these aspects of CEOs personal traits we investigate their age 
(CEO_AGE), tenure (CEO_TENURE) and gender (CEO_GENDER). In untabulated results 
we find that the inclusion of these additional control variables does not change prior 
inferences.  
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6. Conclusion 
In this study we investigate which corporate governance attributes, amongst the many 
that firms employ, are the most prominent ones in explaining the link between governance 
and stock price crashes. We find that collectively the 21 corporate governance attributes we 
use can explain overall between 13.1% and 23.0% of a one standard deviation of future crash 
risk. Further analysis reveals that seven attributes are significantly related to the occurrence 
of future crash risk. Specifically, we find future crashes increase with transient institutional 
ownership, CEO stock option incentives and the percentage of outside directors that hold 
shares, and decrease with percentage of stocks held by insiders, the level of accounting 
conservatism, board size and the existence of a formal governance policy in the companies’ 
mandate. Unlike prior research we do not find opacity of financial reports increase stock 
crashes, yet further analysis reveals that this finding is conditional on the economic cycle. 
Finally, our findings are stronger in less competitive industries and in companies with higher 
uncertainty (where governance as a monitoring mechanism is expected to be more 
important). Overall our analysis shows that corporate governance systems have a significant 
impact on the propensity of the firm to experience a stock price crash.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for 8119 firm-year observations during the period 2002-2013. 
NCSKEW is the negative conditional skewness and DUVOL is the down-to-up volatility. %INST_DED 
(%INST_TRA) is the percentage of equity ownership in the firm by dedicated (transient) institutional investors 
and INST_STD is the average standard deviation of institutional equity holding proportions across all investors 
in the firm over a 5-year period. BLOCK is the number of outside investors who hold 5% or more of equity, 
%INSIDER is the percentage of equity held by insiders and %BRD_STOCK is the percentage of outside 
directors that hold equity in the firm. OPAQUE is the three-year moving sum of the absolute discretionary 
accruals, C_SCORE is accounting conservatism, %AUD_IND is the percentage of outside independent directors 
in the audit committee and AUD_EXPERT is a dummy variable that equals one when the auditors’ firm has 
more than a third of market share of total turnover within an industry. %BRD_IND is the percentage of outside 
directors serving on the board, BRD_SIZE is the number of directors sitting in the board, %BRD_COMP is the 
percentage of directors that also serve on boards of other firms, CEO_DUALITY is a dummy variable that 
equals one when the positions of the CEO and the chairman of the board are held by the same person, and 
GPOL is a dummy variable that equals one when the company has a formal and clearly defined corporate 
governance policy in its mandate. CEO_INC_OPT (CFO_INC_OPT) is the CEO (CFO) option holding 
incentives, CEO_INC_STC (CFO_INC_STC) is the CEO (CFO) stock holding incentives and CEO_BONUS 
(CFO_BONUS) is the CEO (CFO) bonus scaled by salary. DTURN is the de-trended average weekly stock 
trading volume, RETURN is the average firm-specific weekly returns, STD is the volatility of firm-specific 
weekly returns, SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value of equity, MB is the market value of equity to 
book value of equity, LEV is the financial leverage defined as the total liabilities to total assets and ROE is the 
return on equity defined as income before extraordinary items to equity. 
          
Variables Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
25
th
 Percentile 75
th
 Percentile 
Dependent Variables 
NCSKEWt 0.101 0.046 0.811 -0.360 0.498 
DUVOLt -0.000 -0.011 0.364 -0.243 0.227 
Ownership Structure 
%INST_DEDt-1 0.036 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.052 
%INST_TRAt-1 0.173 0.158 0.120 0.089 0.244 
INST_STDt-1 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 
BLOCKt-1 2.677 3.000 1.602 1.000 4.000 
%INSIDERt-1 0.105 0.049 0.140 0.023 0.120 
%BRD_STOCKt-1 0.877 1.000 0.180 0.818 1.000 
Accounting Opacity 
OPAQUEt-1 0.363 0.208 0.468 0.118 0.399 
C_SCOREt-1 0.040 0.035 0.139 -0.038 0.108 
%AUD_INDt-1 0.938 1.000 0.128 1.000 1.000 
AUD_EXPERTt-1 0.226 0.000 0.418 0.000 0.000 
Board Structure & Processes 
%BRD_INDt-1 0.735 0.750 0.140 0.667 0.857 
BRD_SIZEt-1 8.173 9.000 1.546 7.000 10.000 
%BRD_COMPt-1 0.372 0.357 0.321 0.000 0.636 
CEO_DUALITYt-1 0.570 1.000 0.495 0.000 1.000 
GPOLt-1 0.737 1.000 0.440 0.000 1.000 
Managerial Incentives 
CEO_INC_OPTt-1 0.179 0.140 0.150 0.062 0.261 
CEO_INC_STCt-1 0.160 0.081 0.200 0.032 0.195 
CEO_BONUSt-1 0.500 0.000 0.748 0.000 0.845 
CFO_INC_OPTt-1 0.104 0.077 0.100 0.031 0.146 
CFO_INC_STCt-1 0.048 0.028 0.060 0.009 0.064 
CFO_BONUSt-1 0.375 0.051 0.568 0.000 0.600 
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Control Variables      
DTURNt-1 0.863 0.860 19.840 -7.533 9.213 
RETURNt-1 -0.114 -0.077 0.157 -0.140 -0.043 
STDt-1 0.045 0.041 0.020 0.029 0.053 
SIZEt-1 7.460 7.330 1.450 6.375 8.398 
MBt-1 3.143 2.273 8.325 1.553 3.547 
LEVt-1 0.483 0.494 0.193 0.339 0.618 
ROEt-1 0.109 0.114 0.637 0.047 0.180 
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Table 2: Correlation coefficients between corporate governance variables and crash risk. 
 
This table presents the Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the diagonal for 8119 firm-year observations during the period 2002-2013. NCSKEW is the negative 
conditional skewness and DUVOL is the down-to-up volatility. %INST_DED (%INST_TRA) is the percentage of equity ownership in the firm by dedicated (transient) institutional 
investors and INST_STD is the average standard deviation of institutional equity holding proportions across all investors in the firm over a 5-year period. BLOCK is the number of 
outside investors who hold 5% or more of equity, %INSIDER is the percentage of equity held by insiders and %BRD_STOCK is the percentage of outside directors that hold equity 
in the firm. OPAQUE is the three-year moving sum of the absolute discretionary accruals, C_SCORE is accounting conservatism, %AUD_IND is the percentage of outside 
independent directors in the audit committee and AUD_EXPERT is a dummy variable that equals one when the auditors’ firm has more than a third of market share of total turnover 
within an industry. %BRD_IND is the percentage of outside directors serving on the board, BRD_SIZE is the number of directors sitting in the board, %BRD_COMP is the 
percentage of directors that also serve on boards of other firms, CEO_DUALITY is a dummy variable that equals one when the positions of the CEO and the chairman of the board 
are held by the same person, and GPOL is a dummy variable that equals one when the company has a formal and clearly defined corporate governance policy in its mandate. 
CEO_INC_OPT (CFO_INC_OPT) is the CEO (CFO) option holding incentives, CEO_INC_STC (CFO_INC_STC) is the CEO (CFO) stock holding incentives and CEO_BONUS 
(CFO_BONUS) is the CEO (CFO) bonus scaled by salary. Boldface numbers indicate statistical significance at 10% or better. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
Dependent Variables                        
1.NCSKEWt   0.96 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.02 
2.DUVOLt 0.98   0.00 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.03 -0.01 
Ownership Structure                                             
3.BLOCKt-1 0.00 -0.01   0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.21 0.05 -0.04 0.10 -0.16 -0.12 -0.10 0.04 -0.17 -0.15 -0.18 -0.18 -0.10 -0.16 
4.%INST_DEDt-1 0.00 0.01 -0.07   0.18 0.03 0.07 -0.05 -0.05 0.18 -0.06 0.04 -0.08 0.24 -0.02 0.06 -0.15 0.01 -0.05 0.13 0.04 -0.07 0.13 
5.%INST_TRAt-1 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.19   0.25 0.01 -0.01 0.10 0.21 -0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.17 -0.09 0.03 -0.20 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 
6.INST_STDt-1 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.37   0.04 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.12 -0.12 0.00 -0.10 -0.12 -0.01 -0.05 -0.12 -0.06 -0.05 
7.%INSIDERt-1 0.00 -0.01 0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.05   -0.11 0.00 0.24 -0.05 -0.04 -0.36 -0.03 -0.09 -0.04 -0.25 -0.11 0.29 -0.01 -0.11 -0.08 0.00 
8.%BRD_STOCKt-1 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.16   -0.02 -0.13 0.03 0.04 0.13 -0.07 0.18 0.08 0.16 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.17 -0.03 
Accounting Opacity                                             
9.OPAQUEt-1 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.09 0.06 0.02 -0.09   -0.03 -0.02 -0.10 0.01 -0.18 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.09 0.00 0.03 -0.07 
10.C_SCOREt-1 -0.01 -0.02 0.23 0.04 0.19 0.11 0.40 -0.12 0.03   -0.01 -0.08 -0.13 0.04 -0.26 -0.09 -0.36 -0.34 -0.13 -0.12 -0.30 -0.25 -0.12 
11.%AUD_INDt-1 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.00   -0.01 0.51 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.03 
12.AUD_EXPERTt-1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.07 0.00 -0.04 -0.09 0.04 -0.13 -0.09 -0.01   0.03 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.03 
Board Structure & Processes                                             
13.%BRD_INDt-1 -0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.43 0.16 -0.03 -0.15 0.40 0.04   -0.02  0.13 0.21 0.12 -0.14 -0.07 0.04 0.08 -0.08 
14.%BRD_COMPt-1 0.01 0.01 -0.16 0.31 -0.24 -0.17 -0.02 -0.08 -0.06 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.02    0.08 -0.03 0.09 -0.09 0.36 0.14 -0.07 0.34 
15.BRD_SIZEt-1 -0.02 -0.02 -0.22 0.12 -0.13 -0.15 -0.26 0.21 -0.17 -0.33 -0.04 0.15 0.17 0.14  0.06 0.23 0.13 -0.05 0.03 0.11 0.12 0.03 
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16.CEO_DUALITYt-1 -0.01 0.00 -0.10 0.10 0.02 0.00 -0.10 0.09 -0.05 -0.10 0.02 0.03 0.15 0.08 0.10  0.04 0.11 0.20 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.09 
17.GPOLt-1 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.11 -0.16 -0.06 -0.32 0.17 -0.07 -0.38 0.00 0.07 0.21 -0.03 0.27 0.04   0.12 -0.08 -0.00 0.06 0.11 -0.01 
Managerial Incentives                                             
18.CEO_INC_OPTt-1 0.03 0.04 -0.16 0.12 0.01 -0.08 -0.12 -0.02 0.01 -0.34 0.03 0.05 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.11 0.12   0.18 -0.11 0.68 0.17 -0.08 
19.CEO_INC_STCt-1 0.02 0.03 -0.12 -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.07 0.03 -0.23 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.17 -0.00 0.21 0.02 0.19   -0.13 0.11 0.26 -0.07 
20.CEO_BONUSt-1 -0.01 0.00 -0.17 0.21 -0.08 -0.07 0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.10 0.42 0.04 0.08 -0.08 -0.11 -0.22   0.00 -0.06 0.78 
21.CFO_INC_OPTt-1 0.03 0.04 -0.17 0.15 0.00 -0.08 -0.09 -0.03 -0.01 -0.29 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.14 0.08 0.05 0.69 0.10 0.03   0.27 -0.05 
22._CFO_INC_STCt-1 0.01 0.02 -0.08 -0.02 0.07 -0.03 -0.22 0.27 -0.04 -0.33 0.01 0.06 0.16 -0.11 0.21 0.07 0.19 0.17 0.39 -0.14 0.24   -0.09 
23.CFO_BONUSt-1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.17 0.23 -0.09 -0.07 0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.10 0.42 0.04 0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.18 0.86 -0.01 -0.19   
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Table 3. Corporate governance factors and crash risk. 
 
This table presents ordinary least squares coefficient estimates with standard errors adjusted for clustering at the 
firm level between corporate governance factors and crash risk. The sample consists of 8119 firm-year 
observations during the period 2002-2013. Principal Components Analysis (PCA) and the extracted factors are 
explained in Section 4.1. NCSKEW in Panel A is the negative conditional skewness and DUVOL in Panel B is 
the down-to-up volatility. DTURN is the de-trended average weekly stock trading volume, RETURN is the 
average firm-specific weekly returns, STD is the volatility of firm-specific weekly returns, SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of market value of equity, MB is the market value of equity to book value of equity, LEV is the 
financial leverage defined as the total liabilities to total assets and ROE is the return on equity defined as income 
before extraordinary items to equity. DEPENDENTt-1, DEPENDENTt-2 and DEPENDENTt-3 represent lagged 
values of the NCSKEW in Panel A and DUVOL in Panel B. t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis below 
each coefficient. All specifications include a constant, year and industry fixed effects. The term F.F.E. is used to 
indicate the inclusion of firm fixed effects. ***, ** and *, indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level 
or better, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Corporate governance factors and NCSKEW  
Principal components are extracted using 
21 corporate governance attributes 
Principal components are extracted separately using attributes  
within the four corporate governance dimensions 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PC1  -0.035** 
 
0.007 PC_OWN1 0.049*
** 
   0.050*** 0.042** 
 (-2.32) (0.30)  (3.56)    (3.63) (2.22) 
PC2  0.023 0.056** PC_OWN2 -
0.037*
** 
   -0.043*** -0.050** 
 (1.60) (2.22)  (-3.15)    (-3.51) (-2.17) 
PC3 0.018 0.082*** PC_OPAQ1  0.010   0.010 0.052** 
 (1.12) (2.99)   (0.65)   (0.62) (2.05) 
PC4 0.005 -0.013 PC_OPAQ2  0.034**   0.031** 0.043** 
 (0.49) (-0.64)   (2.44)   (2.22) (2.29) 
PC5 -0.007 0.020 PC_BOARD1   -0.013  -0.021 0.011 
 (-0.62) (0.85)    (-0.87)  (-1.39) (0.45) 
PC6 0.059*** 0.046** PC_BOARD2   -0.055  -0.012 0.007 
 (3.94) (2.10)    (-0.36)  (-0.77) (0.28) 
PC7  -0.037** -0.019 PC_INC1    -0.017 -0.019 0.007 
 (-2.45) (-0.84)     (-1.33) (-1.54) (0.36) 
   PC_INC2    0.022* 0.019 0.048** 
       (1.72) (1.44) (2.09) 
   PC_INC3    -0.008 0.014 0.019 
       (-0.71) (1.20) (0.94) 
Control 
Variables 
         
DTURNt-1 0.033*** 0.032**  0.033*
** 
0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.033** 
 (2.82) (2.50)  (2.81) (3.02) (2.99) (3.00) (2.87) (2.57) 
RETURNt-1 -0.005 -0.051**  -0.005 -0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.049* 
 (-0.40) (-2.01)  (-0.38) (-0.03) (-0.21) (-0.05) (-0.25) (-1.95) 
STDt-1 0.001 -0.086**  0.001 0.007 0.002 0.008 0.004 -0.084** 
 (0.03) (-2.51)  (0.05) (0.31) (0.09) (0.36) (0.20) (-2.44) 
SIZEt-1 -0.001 0.299***  0.005 -0.016 0.003 -0.010 -0.004 0.300*** 
 (-0.07) (4.70)  (0.33) (-0.96) (0.20) (-0.63) (-0.24) (4.66) 
MBt-1 -0.025 -0.010  -0.023 -0.025 -0.027 -0.030 -0.024 -0.008 
 (-1.40) (-0.47)  (-1.29) (-1.35) (-1.44) (-1.53) (-1.33) (-0.38) 
LEVt-1 -0.042*** -0.045  -
0.050*
** 
-0.035** -0.040*** -0.038** -0.038*** -0.040 
 (-2.93) (-1.54)  (-3.73) (-2.55) (-2.92) (-2.76) (-2.65) (-1.34) 
ROEt-1 0.063*** 0.065***  0.063*
** 
0.066*** 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 
 (3.91) (3.16)  (4.14) (3.99) (4.09) (3.96) (3.84) (3.17) 
DEPENDENTt-1 0.004 -0.169***  0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 -0.170*** 
 (0.36) (-13.51)  (0.35) (0.44) (0.42) (0.35) (0.30) (-13.54) 
DEPENDENTt-2 0.011 -0.125***  0.009 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.010 -0.125*** 
 (0.95) (-10.04)  (0.83) (1.02) (1.01) (1.04) (0.89) (-9.99) 
DEPENDENTt-3 0.002 -0.098***  0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.099*** 
 (0.19) (-8.00)  (0.09) (0.14) (0.17) (0.21) (0.11) (-8.05) 
F.F.E. NO YES  NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Adj. R
2
 0.019 0.254  0.019 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.020 0.254 
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Panel B: Corporate governance factors and DUVOL  
Principal components are extracted using 
21 corporate governance attributes 
Principal components are extracted separately using attributes  
within the four corporate governance dimensions 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PC1  -0.028* 0.022 PC_OWN1 0.050***    0.051*** 0.044** 
 (-1.80) (1.02)  (3.63)    (3.73) (2.32) 
PC2  0.031** 0.079*** PC_OWN1 -0.043***    -0.050*** -0.053** 
 (2.16) (3.16)  (-3.62)    (-3.98) (-2.33) 
PC3 0.035** 0.108*** PC_OPAQ1  0.017   0.016 0.060** 
 (2.09) (3.95)   (1.11)   (1.01) (2.35) 
PC4 0.010 -0.005 PC_OPAQ2  0.034**   0.031** 0.040** 
 (0.85) (-0.27)   (2.53)   (2.27) (2.16) 
PC5  -0.001 0.032 PC_BOARD1   -0.005  -0.013 0.024 
 (-0.05) (1.38)    (-0.30)  (-0.84) (1.02) 
PC6 0.058*** 0.043** PC_BOARD2   -0.001  -0.010 0.019 
 (3.89) (2.02)    (-0.08)  (-0.64) (0.08) 
PC7  -0.041*** -0.025 PC_INC1    -0.011 -0.013 0.018 
 (-2.69) (-1.09)     (-0.83) (-1.04) (1.00) 
   PC_INC2    0.027** 0.022* 0.062*** 
       (2.03) (1.67) (2.69) 
   PC_INC3    0.016 0.023** 0.037* 
       (1.37) (1.96) (1.87) 
Control 
Variables 
         
DTURNt-1 0.034*** 0.032***  0.035*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 
 (3.02) (2.57)  (3.04) (3.26) (3.23) (3.23) (3.09) (2.66) 
RETURNt-1 -0.025* -0.057**  -0.027** -0.022* -0.024* -0.022* -0.023* -0.056** 
 (-1.96) (-2.23)  (-2.13) (-1.68) (-1.90) (-1.70) (-1.88) (-2.19) 
STDt-1 -0.039* -0.098***  -0.043** -0.036* -0.040* -0.035 -0.036* -0.096*** 
 (-1.81) (-2.86)  (-2.03) (-1.70) (-1.93) (-1.01) (-1.67) (-2.83) 
SIZEt-1 -0.004 0.310***  0.015 -0.008 0.010 -0.003 -0.004 0.316*** 
 (-0.19) (4.88)  (1.08) (-0.51) (0.70) (-0.21) (-0.23) (4.96) 
MBt-1 -0.031** -0.019  -0.029* -0.031* -0.033** -0.036** -0.031** -0.017 
 (-2.08) (-0.86)  (-1.94) (-1.96) (-2.08) (-2.20) (-1.99) (-0.81) 
LEVt-1 -0.052*** -0.060**  -0.063*** -0.046*** -0.054*** -0.049*** -0.050*** -0.058** 
 (3.67) (-2.07)  (-4.71) (-3.39) (-3.96) (-3.55) (3.47) (-1.98) 
ROEt-1 0.065*** 0.063***  0.064*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.063*** 
 (5.18) (3.07)  (5.50) (5.18) (5.26) (4.95) (5.09) (3.08) 
DEPENDENTt-1 0.005 -0.171***  0.004 0.057 0.005 0.005 0.004 -0.172*** 
 (0.42) (-13.84)  (0.33) (0.47) (0.41) (0.40) (0.34) (-13.90) 
DEPENDENTt-2 0.018 -0.123***  0.015 0.018* 0.018 0.019* 0.016 -0.123*** 
 (1.61) (-9.90)  (1.41) (1.68) (1.62) (1.68) (1.51) (9.87) 
DEPENDENTt-3 -0.002 -0.107***  -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.108*** 
 (-0.22) (-8.71)  (-0.37) (-0.30) (-0.28) (-0.23) (-0.32) (-8.79) 
F.F.E. NO YES  NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Adj. R
2
 0.027 0.262  0.022 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.023 0.261 
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Table 4: Corporate governance attributes and crash risk. 
 
This table presents ordinary least squares coefficient estimates with standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level between crash risk measures and corporate 
governance attributes. The sample consists of 8119 firm-year observations during the period 2002-2013. NCSKEW in Panel A is the negative conditional skewness and 
DUVOL in Panel B is the down-to-up volatility. %INST_DED (%INST_TRA) is the percentage of equity ownership in the firm by dedicated (transient) institutional 
investors and INST_STD is the average standard deviation of institutional equity holding proportions across all investors in the firm over a 5-year period. BLOCK is the 
number of outside investors who hold 5% or more of equity, %INSIDER is the percentage of equity held by insiders and %BRD_STOCK is the percentage of outside 
directors that hold equity in the firm. OPAQUE is the three-year moving sum of the absolute discretionary accruals, C_SCORE is accounting conservatism, %AUD_IND is 
the percentage of outside independent directors in the audit committee and AUD_EXPERT is a dummy variable that equals one when the auditors’ firm has more than a third 
of market share of total turnover within an industry. %BRD_IND is the percentage of outside directors serving on the board, BRD_SIZE is the natural logarithm number of 
directors sitting in the board, %BRD_COMP is the percentage of directors that also serve on boards of other firms, CEO_DUALITY is a dummy variable that equals one 
when the positions of the CEO and the chairman of the board are held by the same person, and GPOL is a dummy variable that equals one when the company has a formal 
and clearly defined corporate governance policy in its mandate. CEO_INC_OPT (CFO_INC_OPT) is the CEO (CFO) option holding incentives, CEO_INC_STC 
(CFO_INC_STC) is the CEO (CFO) stock holding incentives and CEO_BONUS (CFO_BONUS) is the CEO (CFO) bonus scaled by salary. t-statistics are reported in the 
parenthesis below each coefficient. All specifications include a constant, control variables, year and industry fixed effects. The term F.F.E. is used to indicate the inclusion of 
firm fixed effects. ***, ** and *, indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively. 
 
        Panel A: Corporate governance attributes and NCSKEW 
 Predicted Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Ownership Structure           
%INST_DEDt-1 - -0.015     -0.014 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 
  (-1.04)     (-0.97) (-0.43) (-0.38) (-0.42) 
%INST_TRAt-1 + 0.060***     0.057*** 0.041* 0.043** 0.041* 
  (4.02)     (3.81) (1.87) (1.97) (1.85) 
INST_STDt-1 + 0.016     0.016 0.023* 0.023* 0.023* 
  (1.37)     (1.39) (1.67) (1.69) (1.68) 
BLOCKt-1 - 0.001     0.016 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 
  (0.71)     (1.22) (-0.41) (-0.49) (-0.40) 
%INSIDERt-1 - -0.023**     -0.026** 0.013 0.016 0.013 
  (-1.97)     (-1.96) (0.46) (0.57) (0.45) 
%BRD_STOCKt-1 ? 0.024**     0.027** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 
  (2.10)     (2.35) (3.24) (3.25) (3.26) 
Accounting Opacity           
OPAQUEt-1 +  0.014    0.011 0.017 0.017 0.017 
   (1.09)    (0.83) (1.03) (1.05) (1.03) 
C_SCOREt-1 -  -0.061***    -0.057*** -0.051** -0.056** -0.051* 
   (3.01)    (-2.70) (-1.95) (-2.18) (-1.95) 
%AUD_INDt-1 -  -0.016    -0.056 -0.213 -0.216 -0.218 
   (-0.19)    (-0.54) (-1.42) (-1.44) (-1.45) 
AUD_EXPERTt-1 -  -0.033    -0.030 0.033 0.035 0.032 
   (-1.21)    (-1.09) (0.58) (0.62) (0.57) 
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Board Structure and Processes           
%BRD_INDt-1 -   0.016   0.004 0.006 0.006 0.006 
    (1.32)   (0.31) (0.22) (0.25) (0.24) 
BRD_SIZEt-1 ?   -0.050**   -0.037 -0.079* -0.083* -0.079* 
    (-2.00)   (-1.43) (-1.66) (-1.75) (-1.67) 
%BRD_COMPt-1 ?   0.001   -0.003 0.011 0.011 0.011 
    (0.06)   (-0.14) (0.41) (0.38) (0.42) 
CEO_DUALITYt-1 +   -0.027   -0.037 -0.014 0.006 -0.013 
    (-1.15)   (-1.49) (-0.35) (0.15) (-0.34) 
GPOLt-1 -   -0.052*   -0.060** 0.004 0.006 0.006 
    (-1.70)   (-1.96) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) 
           
Managerial Incentives           
CEO_INC_OPTt-1 +    0.023*  0.015 0.051**  0.045* 
     (1.79)  (0.93) (2.18)  (1.72) 
CEO_INC_STCt-1 +    -0.000  0.010 0.021  0.022 
     (-0.01)  (0.76) (0.89)  (0.89) 
CEO_BONUSt-1 ?    -0.010  0.000 0.017  0.027 
     (-0.78)  (0.05) (0.92)  (1.12) 
CFO_INC_OPTt-1 +     0.013 -0.004  0.030 0.013 
      (0.99) (-0.25)  (1.44) (0.58) 
CFO_INC_STCt-1 +     0.007 -0.001  0.000 -0.032 
      (0.63) (-0.06)  (0.01) (-0.17) 
CFO_BONUSt-1 ?     -0.020* -0.024  -0.004 -0.014 
      (-1.64) (-1.57)  (-0.24) (-0.62) 
F.F.E.  NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Adj. R
2
  0.019 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.020 0.256 0.256 0.256 
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        Panel B: Corporate governance attributes and DUVOL 
 Predicted Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Ownership Structure 
Ownership 
          
%INST_DEDt-1 - -0.020     -0.018 -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 
  (-1.46)     (-1.35) (-0.57) (-0.50) (-0.55) 
%INST_TRAt-1 + 0.064***     0.060*** 0.048** 0.051** 0.047** 
  (4.36)     (4.03) (2.18) (2.33) (2.14) 
INST_STDt-1 + 0.019*     0.020* 0.027** 0.027** 0.027** 
  (1.65)     (1.70) (1.96) (1.99) (1.98) 
BLOCKt-1 - 0.003     0.010 -0.024 -0.026 -0.024 
  (0.24)     (0.82) (-1.36) (-1.47) (-1.35) 
%INSIDERt-1 - -0.028**     -0.031** 0.007 0.012 0.007 
  (-2.38)     (-2.38) (0.23) (0.41) (0.26) 
%BRD_STOCKt-1 ? 0.027**     0.030** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 
  (2.31)     (2.51) (3.50) (3.47) (3.49) 
Accounting Opacity           
OPAQUEt-1 +  0.010    0.006 0.009 0.009 0.008 
   (0.82)    (0.50) (0.55) (0.55) (0.52) 
C_SCOREt-1 -  -0.075***    -0.066*** -0.064** -0.071*** -0.063** 
   (-3.70)    (-3.09) (-2.47) (-2.76) (-2.43) 
%AUD_INDt-1 -  -0.019    -0.087 -0.243* -0.241 -0.246* 
   (-0.22)    (-0.83) (-1.65) (-1.61) (-1.65) 
AUD_EXPERTt-1 -  -0.031    -0.027 0.014 0.017 0.012 
   (-1.12)    (-0.97) (0.25) (0.29) (0.21) 
Board Structure and Processes           
%BRD_INDt-1 -   0.020*   0.011 0.017 0.018 0.017 
    (1.68)   (0.74) (0.69) (0.73) (0.70) 
BRD_SIZEt-1 ?   -0.057**   -0.043* -0.078* -0.083* -0.078* 
    (2.30)   (-1.69) (-1.66) (-1.77) (-1.67) 
%BRD_COMPt-1 ?   0.002   -0.002 0.013 0.011 0.011 
    (0.11)   (-0.10) (0.47) (0.39) (0.44) 
CEO_DUALITYt-1 +   -0.019   -0.033* -0.024 0.004 -0.022 
    (-0.80)   (-1.35) (-0.60) (0.12) (-0.55) 
GPOLt-1 -   -0.041   -0.047 0.022 0.026 0.025 
    (1.35)   (-1.56) (0.40) (0.47) (0.45) 
Managerial Incentives           
CEO_INC_OPTt-1 +    0.026**  0.015 0.070***  0.066** 
     (1.99)  (0.87) (2.97)  (2.54) 
CEO_INC_STCt-1 +    0.007  0.018 0.032  0.027 
     (0.56)  (1.33) (1.35)  (1.11) 
CEO_BONUSt-1 ?    -0.002  0.011 0.033*  0.046* 
     (-0.13)  (0.67) (1.73)  (1.91) 
CFO_INC_OPTt-1 +     0.016 -0.002  0.030 0.006 
      (1.24) (-0.10)  (1.45) (0.27) 
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CFO_INC_STCt-1 +     0.013 0.002  0.016 0.013 
      (1.08) (0.16)  (0.89) (0.65) 
CFO_BONUSt-1 ?     -0.016 -0.028*  -0.000 -0.018 
      (-1.32) (-1.78)  (-0.00) (-0.83) 
F.F.E.  NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Adj. R
2
  0.023 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.025 0.264 0.263 0.264 
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Table 5. Corporate governance attributes and crash risk: The impact of agency risk. 
 
This table presents ordinary least squares coefficient estimates with standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level between crash risk measures and corporate 
governance attributes for the period 2002-2013. Model estimations are done separately for low and high levels of agency risk using four agency risk proxies: (i) Industry 
Completion is measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, (ii) Return Volatility is measured using the standard deviation of daily stock returns in the last 12 months, 
(iii) Operating Profits Volatility is measured with operating profits volatility computed using the last 5-years’ standard deviation of sales and (iv) Cash Flow Volatility is 
measured following Garfinkel and Hankings (2011) computed as the quarterly volatility of operating profits using the prior 20 periods. NCSKEW in Panel A is the negative 
conditional skewness and DUVOL in Panel B is the down-to-up volatility. %INST_DED (%INST_TRA) is the percentage of equity ownership in the firm by dedicated 
(transient) institutional investors and INST_STD is the average standard deviation of institutional equity holding proportions across all investors in the firm over a 5-year 
period. BLOCK is the number of outside investors who hold 5% or more of equity, %INSIDER is the percentage of equity held by insiders and %BRD_STOCK is the 
percentage of outside directors that hold equity in the firm. OPAQUE is the three-year moving sum of the absolute discretionary accruals, C_SCORE is accounting 
conservatism, %AUD_IND is the percentage of outside independent directors in the audit committee and AUD_EXPERT is a dummy variable that equals one when the 
auditors’ firm has more than a third of market share of total turnover within an industry. %BRD_IND is the percentage of outside directors serving on the board, BRD_SIZE 
is the natural logarithm number of directors sitting in the board, %BRD_COMP is the percentage of directors that also serve on boards of other firms, CEO_DUALITY is a 
dummy variable that equals one when the positions of the CEO and the chairman of the board are held by the same person, and GPOL is a dummy variable that equals one 
when the company has a formal and clearly defined corporate governance policy in its mandate. CEO_INC_OPT (CFO_INC_OPT) is the CEO (CFO) option holding 
incentives, CEO_INC_STC (CFO_INC_STC) is the CEO (CFO) stock holding incentives and CEO_BONUS (CFO_BONUS) is the CEO (CFO) bonus scaled by salary. t-
statistics are reported in the parenthesis below each coefficient. All specifications include a constant, control variables, year and industry fixed effects. The term F.F.E. is used 
to indicate the inclusion of firm fixed effects. F-statistics for comparison of the key coefficients are depicted with the symbol “+” indicating significance at the 0.10 level or 
better. ***, ** and *, indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively.   
 
     Panel A: Corporate governance variables and NCSKEW  
  Industry Competition Return Volatility Operating Profits Volatility Cash Flow Volatility 
  HIGH LOW LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH 
Degree of agency risk: LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH 
 Predicted Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ownership Structure          
%INST_DEDt-1 - -0.014 -0.013 -0.040**
,+
 0.011 -0.021 -0.009 -0.013 -0.012 
  (-0.81) (-0.60) (-2.20) (0.55) (-1.07) (-0.44) (-0.76) (-1.05) 
%INST_TRAt-1 + 0.052*** 0.059*** 0.035 0.057*** 0.085*** 0.033* 0.067*** 0.049** 
  (2.39) (2.88) (1.43) (3.03) (3.68) (1.69) (3.41) (2.06) 
INST_STDt-1 + 0.001 0.028* -0.016 0.035**
,+
 -0.001 0.028* 0.024 0.012 
  (0.07) (1.85) (-0.85) (2.46) (-0.04) (1.87) (1.53) (0.69) 
BLOCKt-1 - 0.007 0.023 0.008 0.025 0.024 0.011 0.023 0.006 
  (0.37) (1.27) (0.40) (1.42) (1.37) (0.60) (1.26) (0.29) 
%INSIDERt-1 - -0.019 -0.030* -0.018 -0.035** -0.017 -0.039** 0.005 -0.057***
,+
 
  (-1.03) (1.64) (-0.89) (-2.16) (-0.90) (-2.16) (0.27) (-3.03) 
%BRD_STOCKt-1 ? 0.023 0.031**
,+
 0.014 0.041*** 0.029 0.031* 0.016 0.028 
  (1.32) (2.03) (0.82) (2.75) (1.62) (1.91) (1.03) (1.55) 
Accounting Opacity          
OPAQUEt-1 + 0.015 0.007 0.015 0.003 0.023 0.004 0.011 0.011 
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  (0.69) (0.40) (0.77) (0.18) (1.18) (0.25) (0.63) (0.54) 
C_SCOREt-1 - -0.056* -0.058* 0.026 -0.107***
,+
 -0.031 -0.091***
,+
 -0.060** -0.071** 
  (-1.88) (-1.89) (0.76) (-3.86) (-1.06) (-2.98) (-1.97) (-2.39) 
%AUD_INDt-1 - -0.064 -0.063 0.041 -0.136 -0.062 -0.059 -0.023 0.130 
  (-0.41) (-0.46) (0.30) (-0.92) (-0.42) (-0.41) (-1.54) (0.88) 
AUD_EXPERTt-1 - -0.052 -0.009 -0.035 -0.025 -0.043 -0.013 -0.022 -0.027 
  (-1.48) (-0.20) (-0.96) (-0.63) (-1.07) (-0.34) (-0.59) (-0.68) 
Board Structure and Processes          
%BRD_INDt-1 - -0.000 0.013 0.003 0.003 0.015 -0.006 0.005 0.007 
  (-0.00) (0.61) (0.16) (0.16) (0.69) (-0.30) (0.28) (0.30) 
BRD_SIZEt-1 ? -0.004 -0.074**
,+
 -0.058 -0.025 -0.020 -0.067* -0.022 -0.044 
  (-0.12) (-2.03) (-1.60) (-0.74) (-0.53) (-1.92) (-0.65) (-1.13) 
%BRD_COMPt-1 ? -0.017 0.015 -0.013 0.008 0.014 -0.014 -0.018 0.006 
  (-0.64) (0.57) (-0.46) (0.30) (0.50) (-0.56) (-0.65) (0.24) 
CEO_DUALITYt-1 + -0.053 -0.027 -0.073** -0.001 -0.023 -0.052 -0.065 -0.011 
  (-1.51) (-1.36) (-2.03) (-0.04) (-0.64) (-1.55) (-0.97) (-0.30) 
GPOLt-1 - -0.026 -0.080* -0.005 -0.086** -0.037 -0.078* -0.010 -0.117**
,+
 
  (-0.55) (-1.90) (-0.12) (-2.08) (-0.74) (-1.93) (-0.22) (-2.41) 
Managerial Incentives          
CEO_INC_OPTt-1 + 0.033 -0.003 -0.011 0.049**
,+
 -0.024 0.044**
,+
 0.033 -0.001 
  (1.45) (-0.12) (-0.53) (1.96) (-0.94) (2.06) (1.42) (-0.05) 
CEO_INC_STCt-1 + 0.014 0.006 0.005 0.015 0.018 0.010 0.015 0.000 
  (0.65) (0.34) (0.31) (0.77) (0.97) (0.50) (0.84) (0.05) 
CEO_BONUSt-1 ? 0.008 -0.005 0.002 -0.008 -0.004 -0.002 -0.000 0.001 
  (0.34) (-0.22) (0.09) (-0.32) (-0.17) (-0.08) (-0.00) (0.05) 
CFO_INC_OPTt-1 + 0.000 -0.006 0.019 -0.037 0.012 -0.016 -0.017 0.010 
  (0.21) (-0.27) (1.00) (-1.40) (0.52) (-0.73) (-0.81) (0.38) 
CFO_INC_STCt-1 + 0.007 -0.012 0.003 -0.011 0.006 -0.014 -0.012 0.015 
  (0.39) (-0.72) (0.22) (-0.62) (0.34) (-0.83) (-0.73) (0.89) 
CFO_BONUSt-1 ? -0.035 -0.017 -0.035* -0.009 -0.021 -0.026 -0.012 -0.032 
  (-1.59) (-0.79) (-1.66) (-0.40) (-0.92) (-1.21) (-0.60) (-1.31) 
No. Obs.  4074 4045 4059 4060 3945 4174 4241 3694 
Adj. R
2
  0.014 0.024 0.017 0.042 0.018 0.025 0.016 0.029 
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     Panel B: Corporate governance variables and DUVOL  
  Industry Competition Return Volatility Operating Profits Volatility Cash Flow Volatility 
  HIGH LOW LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH 
Degree of agency risk: LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH 
 Predicted Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ownership Structure          
%INST_DEDt-1 - -0.019 -0.016 -0.042**
,+
 0.004 -0.025 -0.012 -0.015 -0.028 
  (-1.07) (-0.84) (-2.30) (0.20) (-1.40) (-0.60) (-0.88) (-1.34) 
%INST_TRAt-1 + 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.034 0.065*** 0.088*** 0.036*
,+
 0.064*** 0.060*** 
  (2.74) (2.92) (1.35) (3.52) (3.89) (1.85) (3.23) (2.59) 
INST_STDt-1 + 0.005 0.032**
,+
 -0.009 0.037**
,+
 -0.000 0.033**
,+
 0.026 0.018 
  (0.26) (2.02) (-0.48) (2.54) (-0.02) (2.16) (1.59) (1.07) 
BLOCKt-1 - -0.003 0.021 0.002 0.024 0.020 0.005 0.018 -0.001 
  (-0.18) (1.19) (0.11) (1.38) (1.14) (0.30) (1.02) (-0.05) 
%INSIDERt-1 - -0.022 -0.042** -0.033 -0.035** -0.019 -0.051*** -0.006 -0.064***
,+
 
  (-1.19) (-2.22) (-1.61) (-2.05) (-1.02) (-2.78) (-0.30) (-3.36) 
%BRD_STOCKt-1 ? 0.028 0.031** 0.017 0.042*** 0.026 0.037** 0.019 0.030* 
  (1.56) (2.01) (1.02) (2.83) (1.52) (2.21) (1.20) (1.64) 
Accounting Opacity          
OPAQUEt-1 + -0.003 0.005 0.011 -0.007 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.023 
  (-0.13) (0.30) (0.61) (-0.46) (0.53) (0.24) (0.34) (0.13) 
C_SCOREt-1 - -0.066** -0.062** 0.040 -0.122***
,+
 -0.046 -0.091*** -0.067** -0.082*** 
  (-2.19) (-2.02) (1.15) (-4.45) (-1.51) (-3.03) (-2.24) (-2.69) 
%AUD_INDt-1 - -0.088 -0.114 0.022 -0.92 -0.120 -0.066 -0.021 0.032 
  (-0.56) (-0.79) (0.15) (-1.34) (-0.82) (-0.45) (-1.42) (0.22) 
AUD_EXPERTt-1 - -0.049 -0.001 -0.023 -0.036 -0.048 -0.000 -0.016 -0.027 
  (-1.41) (-0.02) (-0.63) (-0.91) (-1.21) (-0.00) (-0.42) (-0.70) 
Board Structure and Processes          
%BRD_INDt-1 - 0.008 0.019 0.008 0.010 0.020 0.001 0.007 0.002 
  (0.40) (0.87) (0.41) (0.51) (0.95) (0.03) (0.37) (0.91) 
BRD_SIZEt-1 ? -0.008 -0.082**
,+
 -0.064* -0.037 -0.018 -0.079** -0.029 -0.051 
  (-0.23) (-2.23) (-1.78) (-1.07) (-0.47) (-2.21) (-0.82) (-1.32) 
%BRD_COMPt-1 ? -0.010 0.010 -0.013 0.009 0.009 -0.007 -0.015 0.006 
  (-0.35) (0.40) (-0.49) (0.35) (0.32) (-0.31) (-0.54) (0.21) 
CEO_DUALITYt-1 + -0.046 -0.033 -0.070* -0.005 -0.019 -0.052 -0.069** -0.006 
  (-1.28) (-0.92) (-1.91) (-0.16) (-0.52) (-1.54) (-2.03) (-0.15) 
GPOLt-1 - -0.015 -0.070* 0.004 -0.073* -0.015 -0.070* -0.006 -0.108**
,+
 
  (-0.33) (-1.66) (0.10) (-1.80) (-0.32) (-1.70) (-0.14) (-2.25) 
Managerial Incentives          
CEO_INC_OPTt-1 + 0.033 -0.003 -0.011 0.050**
,+
 -0.023 0.046**
,+
 0.033 -0.001 
  (1.42) (-0.14) (-0.56) (2.03) (-0.90) (2.08) (1.41) (-0.02) 
CEO_INC_STCt-1 + 0.021 0.014 0.010 0.025 0.025 0.018 0.016 0.016 
  (0.96) (0.78) (0.58) (1.29) (1.39) (0.86) (0.83) (0.84) 
CEO_BONUSt-1 ? 0.026 -0.005 0.021 -0.007 0.004 0.010 -0.002 0.019 
  (1.05) (-0.23) (0.86) (-0.33) (0.19) (0.40) (-0.09) (0.74) 
CFO_INC_OPTt-1 + 0.002 -0.007 0.020 -0.041 0.014 -0.015 -0.011 0.006 
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  (0.08) (-0.30) (1.05) (-1.58) (0.63) (-0.69) (-0.52) (0.23) 
CFO_INC_STCt-1 + 0.012 -0.010 0.012 -0.017 0.006 -0.007 -0.013 0.025 
  (0.66) (-0.60) (0.77) (-0.89) (0.37) (-0.35) (-0.73) (1.38) 
CFO_BONUSt-1 ? -0.041* -0.015 -0.041* -0.006 -0.023 -0.029 -0.002 -0.043* 
  (-1.82) (-0.68) (-1.91) (-0.26) (-1.03) (-1.31) (-0.10) (-1.77) 
No. Obs.  4074 4045 4059 4060 3945 4174 4241 3694 
Adj. R
2
  0.019 0.027 0.014 0.050 0.023 0.028 0.020 0.033 
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Table 6. Corporate governance attributes and crash risk: The impact of crisis on accounting opacity. 
 
This table presents ordinary least squares coefficient estimates with standard errors adjusted for clustering at the 
firm level between crash risk measures and corporate governance attributes with emphasis on the interplay 
between accounting opacity and the crisis period. The sample consists of 8119 firm-year observations during the 
period 2002-2013. NCSKEW is the negative conditional skewness and DUVOL is the down-to-up volatility. 
For brevity the table presents only the accounting opacity (OPAQUE) and accounting conservatism (C_SCORE) 
variables. CRISIS_POST takes the value of one for all years after 2009, CRISIS takes the value of one for the 
fiscal year 2010 and POST_CRISIS takes the value of one for all years after 2010. All specifications include a 
constant, all other corporate governance attributes, control variables, year and industry fixed effects. ***, ** and 
*, indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively.     
 
 
  NCSKEW DUVOL 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Accounting Opacity      
OPAQUEt-1 + 0.061** 0.061** 0.047* 0.047* 
  (2.31) (2.31) (1.83) (1.83) 
OPAQUEt-1 * CRISIS_POST - -0.063**  -0.052*  
  (-2.10)  (-1.79)  
OPAQUEt-1 * CRISIS -  -0.067**  -0.056* 
   (-2.01)  (-1.81) 
OPAQUEt-1 * POST_CRISIS -  -0.059*  -0.047 
   (-1.73)  (-1.40) 
C_SCOREt-1 - -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.064*** -0.064*** 
  (-2.62) (-2.62) (-3.02) (-3.02) 
Adj. R
2
  0.021 0.021 0.025 0.025 
      
